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Introduction
1 Historians and criminologists have frequently commented upon the considerable under-
reporting  of  offences  such  as  embezzlement  and  fraudulence,  and  the subsequent
darkness  that  surrounds  academic  knowledge  of  this  subject.  Descriptions  of  the
statistical picture of workplace crime as only «the tip of the iceberg» are commonplace
within academic scholarship, with most incidents remaining hidden in the records and
correspondence of individual companies. Indeed, existing research has widely recognised
the preference of employers to deal privately with most workplace offenders through
internal mechanisms of justice, and an apparent reluctance to pursue the majority of
cases through official channels2: «One of the first sure conclusions reached after a study
of embezzlements is that the larger number of them are never made public»3. However,
despite  general  agreement  about  the considerable  usefulness  of  the private  arena in
supplementing knowledge of various workplace offending behaviours, scholars have yet
to utilise fully the private records of  the business arena or unlock their potential  to
elucidate  the  nature  and  extent  of  «respectable»,  «white-collar»  offending,  and  the
attitudes  of  employers  to  this  behaviour.  Scholarly  understandings  of  this  subject
consequently remain firmly tied to the public arena and the limited public face of such
crime.  As a result,  the offences of  the business world,  including embezzlement,  have
remained  something  of  an  enigma,  presenting  at  best  a  skewed  picture  of  such
delinquency4. Any successful attempt to map the disciplinary apparatus utilised within
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the private arena against embezzlement and other acts of fraudulence must fully engage
the concealed world of industry.
2 This article probes the records of one key Victorian industry, the railways5, and one of the
most  prolific  offences  associated  with  the  business  arena,  embezzlement,  to  expand
scholarly knowledge of the dynamics of public and private justice amongst «respectable»,
white-collar offenders. In so doing, it questions existing academic «knowledge» of the
motivations underpinning private mechanisms of justice in such cases, emphasising the
inseparable relationship between the punitive worlds of the public and private.
 
Interpreting prosecutorial trends: existing frameworks
3 To  date  scholars  have  suggested  a  number  of  explanations  for  the  overwhelmingly
private nature of  justice in cases of  suspected embezzlement and otherwise financial
dishonesty6.  In  detailing  the  specific  offence  of  embezzlement  within  the  modern
business  environment,  socio-legal  scholar,  Jerome  Hall,  has  presented  a  number  of
general claims in order to explain the largely hidden nature of the offence7. First, Hall
argued that popular discourses and stereotypes of the criminal,  and particularly «the
thief»,  dissuaded  employees  from  punishing  embezzlers.  The  embezzler’s  typically
«respectable» appearance and social  position placed this  offender at  a  distance from
more orthodox images of the thief – such as the robber, burglar, or pickpocket. Public
condemnation,  and therefore the most punitive responses to the thief,  thus focussed
mainly upon the «traditional» offender, while the embezzler was largely sidelined in such
debates. The embezzler’s «respectable» persona, Hall suggested, made him more difficult
to  portray  as  a  «real»  criminal  threat,  and  the  existence  of  such  attitudes  amongst
employers can explain the basis for the persistence of greater levels of sympathy towards
the  embezzling  employee,  and  subsequently  more  leniency  in  punishment  through
private and informal methods. Second, Hall has suggested that the paternalistic instincts
of employers towards trusted staff, alongside an ability to identify with the «respectable»
embezzler at a social level and to sympathise with the motives underlying their offending
behaviour, may have further encouraged the use of private rather than public justice.
Third, Hall noted that a number of pragmatic considerations, particularly relating to the
cost and inconvenience of prosecution, together with the adverse publicity and damage
potentially  caused  by  public  acknowledgement  of  vulnerability  to  embezzlement  by
trusted  staff,  encouraged  low  levels  of  public  prosecution8.  Fourth,  and  of  central
importance to the prosecution decision, was the question of financial restitution. Hall
argued that in cases where companies informally recouped losses through this means, the
utility of a prosecution was possibly reduced. Central to the decision of whether or not to
prosecute was the individual’s ability to repay monies fraudulently taken, and so the final
action was affected by the financial  significance or harm of the embezzlement itself,
which therefore played a further role in the prosecutorial decision9.
4 Underlying these claims are a number of assumptions about the widespread existence
and persistence of private justice in the case of the embezzler. In particular, Hall assumes
that  the  embezzler  was  viewed differently,  indeed more  sympathetically,  than other
varieties  of  criminal;  that  the  utilisation  of  private  rather  than  public  methods  of
punishment was a decision largely (if not entirely) in the hands of company management
and senior officials; that such patterns represented a preference on their part for private
justice, based upon a more compassionate attitude towards this type of offender and a
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desire for greater leniency; and that internal mechanisms of punishment were chosen
because they were less punitive and more moderate. However, while claims about the
overwhelmingly private nature of justice in cases of embezzlement remain accurate and
demonstrable across historical time and commercial enterprise, a detailed examination of
the private records of the Victorian and Edwardian railway industry strongly suggests
that the factors which underpinned the decision to punish privately rather than publicly
in most cases, are markedly different from those offered by Hall.
 
The spatial dynamics of company justice: a case
study of the railway industry
5 By the nineteenth century the existence of  a  modern legal  offence of  embezzlement
bolstered the public face of the crime, making prosecution a viable sanction against all
such offenders. After 1799 all «clerks» and «servants» could be held legally culpable for
the appropriation of money received and handled by them on behalf of an employer,
providing unprecedented statutory support for railway (and other) companies in dealing
with such offenders10. Thus, throughout the nineteenth century (and beyond) the public
prosecutorial  trend  was  one  of  upward  movement,  as  employers  brought  increasing
numbers of embezzling staff before the courts11. Furthermore, the unprecedented size of
the railway industry and numbers of trusted servants employed within it12 made breach
of trust offences a particularly significant problem within this arena, and the prosecution
of a proportion of such staff meant that the industry was often well represented within
the public picture of embezzlement13. Indeed, the employment of public mechanisms of
justice  against  those  who  breached  trust  was  an  integral  aspect  of  the  disciplinary
apparatus  for  many  railway  companies.  Directors  regularly  expressed  a  desire  and
commitment  to  fully  utilise  their  legal  powers  to  protect  against  the  embezzler  and
fraudster, with prosecution considered to be the main avenue through which to punish
embezzling staff whenever possible. For example, the official policy of companies such as
the Great Western Railway (GWR) was to proceed criminally against all «provable» cases
of  fraudulence,  embezzlement  and  other  forms  of  dishonesty.  The  need  for  strict
adherence to this policy was clearly observable in a memorandum from the company
directors, who, in an attempt to set out «a uniform course of procedure for dealing with
cases of this nature», resolved that «in all proved cases of defalcation, embezzlement and
falsification of the company’s books the offender will be prosecuted»14. While such claims
were undoubtedly an attempt to deter those whose trusted position inevitably produced
opportunities for criminality, they were more than empty threats. Thus, throughout the
Victorian  and  Edwardian  periods  railway  companies  regularly  prosecuted  staff  for
embezzlement and demonstrated a consistent desire to do so in all  cases where this
appeared possible15. However, as the private records of the industry detail, only a small
proportion of all financial «irregularity», embezzlement and fraudulence was officially
prosecuted.  Thus,  despite  threatening  public  prosecution  against  all  embezzling  and
otherwise fraudulent staff, and despite significant numbers of prosecutions, only a slight
proportion of all such cases were ever brought before the public courts. Instead directors
disposed of large numbers of untrustworthy, suspicious or financially «irregular» staff,
through internal, private modes of company justice16.
6 An exploration of the private world of the railway industry, however, demonstrates that
this  picture cannot  be adequately  explained through recourse to  existing theoretical
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arguments. Indeed, rather than being conditioned by issues of leniency, paternalism or
financial costs, as Hall suggested, the records of the Victorian and Edwardian railway
industry strongly reveal that these variables were of little importance in encouraging a
predominantly  private  system  of  justice.  Instead,  alternative  factors  (currently
unrecognised within historical scholarship) played a major role in enforcing the necessity
of  private  punishment.  The most  fundamental  dynamic in this  process  derived from
within the legal arena, centring upon statutory intricacies which problematised the issue
of obtaining satisfactory legal proof of embezzlement to proceed criminally against the
offence.
 
The importance of proof
7 A key deficiency in current interpretations of the extent of private punishment is in its
exaggeration of the agency attributable to employers in directing the punitive outcomes
of  offending  behaviour.  Indeed,  existing  research  has  overemphasised  the  power  of
employers,  and  assumed  that  company  officials  held  complete  discretion  over  the
decision of whether or not to pursue a prosecution. The general intimation of existing
research has been that for a variety of reasons those in a position to prosecute actively
chose not to, instead preferring private modes of justice17. In fact, as a consequence of the
inadequacies  of  statutory provision in the area of  embezzlement,  when dealing with
suspected embezzlers it was rarely the case that officials possessed the power to decide
whether  or  not  to  pursue  a  public  or  private  course  of  action.  The  legal  offence  of
embezzlement was extremely difficult to establish, meaning successful prosecutions were
hard  to  achieve.  The  main  problem  for  private  companies  was  the  difficulty  of
ascertaining  whether  missing  money  had  been  fraudulently  appropriated.  Simply
collecting money on behalf of the company and not immediately accounting for it did not
necessarily imply the offence of embezzlement; in fact the handling of company money
was  an  essential  and  legitimate  part  of  the  clerk or  confidential  servant’s  role.
Embezzlement was only chargeable if it could be proved that, in not accounting for the
money, a clerk or servant had fraudulently intended to deprive their employer of the
amount. In legal terms, therefore, the success of a prosecution was heavily contingent on
proving the mens rea of the crime18. Thus, in many cases of «irregularity» the distinction
between an honest mistake and an embezzlement rested upon the intention of the clerk
in keeping back money received on behalf of the company. This was often difficult or
impossible to judge with any certainty (and to a far greater degree than in other varieties
of  theft)19.  The facts pertaining to many cases did not present a clear picture of  the
motivations of clerks who were deficient in their cash, and in such an environment claims
of mistake were easy to make, often leaving employers uncertain about the true facts of a
case. In short, in cases where money had been retained by a clerk without any fraudulent
intention to permanently deprive the employer of the amount, an honest mistake was all
that  had  occurred;  however,  in  cases  where  the  failure  to  account  for  money  was
accompanied by an intention to deprive the employer, the act was one of embezzlement.
8 Within huge concerns such as the railway industry, where large numbers of clerks and
other  staff  were  trusted  with  receiving  and  handling  company  money,  the  task  of
deciphering  the  true  nature  of  an  act  of  financial  «irregularity»  was  particularly
problematic, since constant supervision was impossible and missing money was a regular
feature of  clerical  work.  Indeed,  the industry’s  records demonstrate that  clerks were
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frequently  short  in  their  financial  accounts  and  balances.  For  example,  in  1850  Mr
Greenstock, a clerk at Bath, was reported to the directors of the GWR for «being deficient
in his accounts»20, and in 1851 Mr Duncan, a clerk at Maidenhead, was similarly charged
with «being deficient in his accounts»21. Elsewhere, on 10th June 1853 it was reported to
the North Eastern Railway (NER) Traffic Committee that deficiencies had been discovered
in  the  accounts  of  Mr  Johnson,  stationmaster  at  Knaresbro’,  and Mr  Eastgate,
stationmaster  at  Bolton  Percy22.  However,  such  acts  did  not  immediately  imply
fraudulence. Honest errors were a familiar part of clerical work, and, as a result, cases of
«irregularity» were regularly adjudged to be the consequence of non-criminal actions.
Incompetence was not infrequent, even by those in senior positions, and often led to
mistakes. The example of Mr Benson, a stationmaster at Stovingham, is illustrative. In
1853 a complaint was made against Benson for the way that he kept his books. In the
inquiry which followed it was reported that «he was upward of sixty years of age, and had
not been much accustomed to accounts», in consequence of which, he had made many
mistakes. Furthermore, despite instruction in the correct method of keeping accounts by
a clerk from the audit office, Benson remained unequal to the task. Thus, it was reported
to the company directors, that «every endeavour had been made to instruct him on the
duties  of  the  station,  but  without  avail,  as  he  appeared  to  be  quite  incapable  of
understanding them»23. Such cases of ineptitude, however undesirable, were nevertheless
not  criminal24,  and numerous  instances  of  clerks  being  disciplined  for  honest
incompetence were recorded in the official documents of the railway industry. Typical
was the case of two Yeovil goods clerks, Mr Fryer and Mr Wilkins, brought before the
GWR board in 1857. In commenting on the work of the clerks in dealing with sums of
money, Mr Wood, company accountant, «reported that both clerks were deficient in their
cash to some extent and that the books had been kept in a very careless manner»25. The
men were subsequently removed from the service of the company for negligence, but
since their errors were not considered to be driven by fraudulence, prosecution was not
considered.
9 Instances of clerks short-changing members of the public were also regularly explained
and accepted as mistakes. For example, in 1852 Mr Battersley, a clerk at Slough, was
accused  by  Mr  Allfrey  of  having  overcharged  by  2s.  in handling  money  for  tickets.
Battersley claimed that «owing to the number of passengers taking tickets by that train
he has no recollection of the occurrence», but that he was innocent of any fraudulence.
Mr Battersley’s superiors described him as «in every way an excellent clerk … incapable
of overcharging a passenger wilfully», and as such «he was acquitted of any intentional
fraud and the whole was entertained as occurring from mistake in the luxury of business»
26.
10 The  frequency  of  honest  financial  «irregularities»  appearing before  the  directors  of
railway  companies  is  readily  explicable.  The  role  of  clerk  was  often  a  complex  and
demanding one27, and so: «early days in the job were frequently difficult unless one had a
sympathetic  mentor»28.  Of  course  not  all  claims  of  mistake  were  considered  to  be
legitimate; some were thought to be suspicious or even false, and used to cover up acts of
fraudulence  or  embezzlement.  Such  was  the  case  when  Mr  Allen,  station  clerk  at
Basingstoke, was called before the directors for having entered extra amounts on the pay
cheques to those due to the men, and for having kept the additional money. While Allen
claimed that «it was a mistake» rather than an act of embezzlement, the suspicions of the
directors meant he was not believed29.  However, even in cases where suspicions were
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aroused,  proving  embezzlement  sufficiently  fully  to  enable  a  successful  prosecution
remained problematic. Allen, for instance, was only dismissed from the service of the
company on suspicion of fraudulence since insufficient evidence existed to consider a
prosecution against the clerk. The difficulties involved in proving an offence (even one
arousing considerable suspicion) are lucidly demonstrated in the case of GWR pay clerk,
Charles White, before the board of directors in the early 1890s.
 
The case of Charles White
11 On Saturday, 7th November 1891, Charles White departed for his annual holiday. On the
following Monday it was discovered that he had failed to account for two sums of money:
one of £40 entrusted to him for the payment of wages, and another of £12.3s.5d from his
petty  cash.  Both  of  these  amounts  were  later  settled  by  White;  however,  the
circumstances  of  the occurrence generated some suspicion of  dishonesty  against  the
clerk. On 11th November he was therefore suspended from duty pending an inquiry, and,
on 24th November, resigned from the service of the company. Almost a year later,  in
September  1892,  White  wrote  to  the  board  of  directors  asking  to  be  reinstated  and
revisiting the circumstances in which his employment had come to an end. The case
clearly  highlighted  the  problems  of  proving fraudulence  in  cases  where  financial
«irregularities» were discovered, since the facts failed to prove satisfactorily whether
White  had  been  dishonest  or  had  simply  made  a  mistake.  White  claimed that  the
«irregularity» had been the result of an oversight on his part in not accounting for the
money before leaving his post. In a letter to the directors he explained the circumstances
of the case thus:
On leaving for my holidays,  Saturday 7th November,  1891,  in the excitement of
wishing the usual farewell to a few of my contemporaries I did foolishly forget to
take an amount of £40 to Mr Lane in the Booking Office which I had placed in my
pocket for that purpose, and I am very sorry to say did not discover it until the
following  Monday  morning  when  I  immediately  went  to  that  gentleman  and
handed him the money30.
12 According to White, his honest mistake was evidenced by the fact that he «voluntarily
went to Paddington with the money», rather than being called upon to do so. However, in
White’s  version of  events his  explanation had been «discredited» by Mr Hugh Owen,
superintendent of the GWR line, who looked upon the «irregularity» in a «very serious
and harsh way», and who refused to advise the clerk on what steps to take in the matter
saying, «I leave that to your own discretion». White claimed that when he enquired about
«the clemency of the board» in deciding the outcome of his case, he was informed by
Owen that he «should get no consideration for so grave an irregularity». Furthermore, he
claimed that  these circumstances  brought  considerable pressure upon him to resign,
which he did in late November, after sixteen years faithful service with the company.
13 The account given by White’s immediate superiors was, however, somewhat different. Mr
George Boxall, stated that on Saturday, 7th November, before his departure White had
been «asked if he had handed all his business over clean to his successor» to which he
replied in the affirmative. Yet on the following Monday it was discovered that White had,
in fact,  failed to account for the two sums of  money «which he had in hand on the
previous Friday, and which should have been handed over on Friday afternoon». The
larger amount of £40 was only paid at midday on Monday 9th November, and the smaller
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amount of petty cash was not returned until three days later. In recounting this incident
Boxall  expressed  unease  about  the  suspicious  nature  of  the  «irregularity»  claiming,
«there was no reason whatever for Mr White to concern himself about the business after
Saturday». Furthermore, the suspension of White was deemed to be in strict accordance
with the rules of the company, and «upon no occasion was any pressure put upon him to
induce him to resign». Instead, «his resignation was entirely voluntary after nearly a
fortnights consideration», perhaps raising further questions about the clerk’s honesty in
the matter31. Thus, while some suspicion of White’s behaviour existed on the part of his
superiors, the precise nature of the case and the intention of White in keeping back the
sums of company money nevertheless remained uncertain. White’s failure to remit the
money in his possession was not proof of fraudulence or embezzlement, and his readiness
to hand some of the money over promptly before being called upon to do so may have
supported his claim of oversight. However, the statements made by White’s superiors
concerning  his  failure  to  return  the  money  entrusted  him before  leaving  the  office
(despite being reminded to) at least cast a shadow of doubt over the clerk’s intentions. In
consequence,  the  company  directors  remained  unsure  about  the  motivation  behind
White’s  «irregularity».  Therefore,  while  the  suspicions  they  entertained  were  strong
enough to  denounce  «the  grave  irregularities»,  committed  by  White  and  to  order  a
thorough inquiry into the case, conversely his claim of mistake was credible enough to
encourage  Hugh  Owen  to  recommend  that  the  clerk  should  be  given  «a  chance  of
redeeming his character in another department»32, when the appeal for reinstatement
was made.
14 In cases of this nature, where uncertainty existed about the underlying causes of a clerk’s
behaviour, the vague and all-encompassing label of «irregularity» was the only one that
could be imposed. The precise legal terminology of «embezzlement» could not be charged
as  long  as  doubt  about  the  fraudulent  intentions  of  the  clerk  persisted,  and in  this
ambiguous climate prosecution remained both inaccessible and unachievable in most
cases.  Indeed,  as  echoed  in  many  further  examples  of  «irregularity»,  despite  being
considered  serious  and  suspicious,  prosecution  was  never  contemplated  in  the
correspondence surrounding White’s case. Furthermore, given the eagerness of directors
to prosecute in cases of more resounding proof of dishonesty, the reason behind their
decision  was  almost  certainly  their  inability  to  ascertain  the  true  nature  of  the
«irregularity» or utilise legal measures to deal with it.
 
Prosecutorial caution
15 While the difficulties of acquiring sufficient proof of dishonesty to mount a prosecution
kept many cases out of the criminal justice system, legal technicalities surrounding the
offence  meant  that  even  where  sufficient  evidence  existed  to  proceed  to  court
prosecutions might still be undermined. In 1857, for instance, a prosecution against John
Horsfield for embezzlement «had failed on a technicality»33. Where prosecutions failed,
not only did companies have to bear the burden of further lost time and money, they
potentially also had to deal with counter claims by the dismissed clerk or servant. This
was the case in 1855 when Mr Found, a clerk at Shrewsbury goods station, was reported
for being deficient in his cash to the extent of £78.6s.9d and was subsequently prosecuted
for embezzlement34.  In 1856,  following an unsuccessful prosecution, Found’s solicitors
wrote to the directors requesting compensation for the financial losses suffered by the
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clerk  in  consequence  of  «an  unfounded  charge  of  embezzlement  having  been  made
against him which was afterwards disproved»35. To avoid such problems as far as possible
it was therefore important that prosecutions were undertaken only in cases where the
likelihood of a conviction was high. Thus, in 1856 the directors of the NER advised that a
number of  porters at  Hull,  who had received and not accounted for passenger fares,
should only «be prosecuted if clear cases can be made out against them»36. Also, in 1853 when
Mr Pybus, stationmaster at Cramlington, was found to be deficient in his accounts to the
amount  of  about  £30,  it  was  ordered  that  he  be  prosecuted  only  «if  a  case  can  be
established against him»37.
16 In judging the suitability of cases for prosecution directors were heavily reliant upon
company solicitors in determining the advisability of proceeding to court, and records
demonstrate that even in cases where directors strongly suspected dishonesty to the
extent that they were happy to instigate a prosecution, company solicitors frequently
advised against such a course due to the likelihood that the case would fail. In 1871, for
instance, when two GWR booking clerks, Mr Crosse and Mr Rowlandson, were suspected
of  having systematically embezzled company money,  the directors proposed that  the
clerks  be  proceeded  against  criminally.  However,  despite  their  suspicion  and
recommendation to pursue the case within the public arena, the board were advised by
company solicitors, «that the evidence in these cases would not support an indictment for
embezzlement»38.  In  fact,  in  this  case  the  directors  expressed  considerable
disappointment that in so flagrant a case of dishonesty an official course of action was
not possible. Furthermore, they voiced a strong belief that despite insufficient evidence
to maintain a public prosecution, the case was one of fraudulence, and «there being no
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the persons implicated in these frauds it is to be regretted
that they cannot be prosecuted»39. A similar case was reported in 1855 at the GWR when it
was discovered that «Mr Kent the company’s agent at the Wheatsheaf Station has been
proved by an inspection of his accounts to have embezzled the monies of the company to
a considerable extent». Instructions were given «to proceed criminally against Kent for
the embezzlement and he was dismissed from the service of the company»40. However, it
was  subsequently  reported  to  the  directors,  that  «after  careful  examination  by  the
solicitor of the circumstances of his dealings it is doubtful whether the company can
legally obtain a conviction against him for embezzlement»: no prosecution was therefore
instigated41.
17 The central  importance of  proof in determining the nature of  punishment is  further
illustrated by the likelihood of prosecution in cases where embezzlement was clear and
unquestionable. For example, in the case of Mr Robson, a NER booking clerk at Durham
who had been detected keeping back excess  fares,  «full  proof  of  his  having done so
existed», and it was therefore ordered «that he be prosecuted»42. Similarly, in 1878 when
William  Goddard  Owen,  a  GWR  rent  collector  at  Oxford,  was  discovered  to  have
embezzled a number of rents owed to the company, clear proof of the clerk’s guilt meant
that he was immediately «given into custody» to be taken before the Oxford Magistrates43
. In other cases, a confession of guilt also provided the necessary proof of fraudulence to
mount a prosecution, and in such instances committals to court were highly likely. Thus,
in 1896 when David Owen gave himself into custody «and confessed to having embezzled
about £30 of the Company’s money», he was immediately sent for trial at the assizes
where he pleaded guilty  and was  sentenced to  six  months’  imprisonment  with hard
labour44. Indeed, where sufficient proof of guilt could be obtained, companies often went
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to considerable lengths to detain and prosecute offenders. For example, in cases where
men  absconded  with  company  money  (usually  signifying  the  necessary  element  of
fraudulent intent for prosecution) directors resourced their detection and capture so that
a prosecution could be made, pursuing confidential staff across the country and even
abroad45.
18 In  sum,  in  most  cases  of  financial  «irregularity»  and delinquency  the  complex  legal
nature of «embezzlement» made it impossible to establish sufficient proof for a successful
prosecution  to  occur  and  made  private  justice  a  necessity.  Thus,  one  of  the  chief
determining factors  in  deciding the public  or  private  nature of  proceedings  was  the
nature of statutory provision and subsequently the availability, or otherwise, of proof.
The  issue  of  legal  proof  preceded and outweighed other  issues  in  informing public/
private trends in justice against the (suspected) embezzler. Faced with a difficult legal
arena companies had little choice but to pursue cases privately.
 
Exploring the use of private justice
19 The internal disciplinary responses of railway employers to those accused of breaching
confidential trust adds further weight to the above claims while questioning the utility of
established aetiological explanations for the predominance of private justice. As strongly
evidenced  in  the  records  of  the  railway  industry,  private  responses  were  typically
stringent  rather  than  lenient,  with  official  reactions  towards  suspected  employees
extending  to  the  maximum censure  possible  without  notable  concern  for  pragmatic
issues such as cost, time or public reputation, nor for the welfare of fraudulent staff.
Thus,  where  insufficient  evidence  made  prosecution  impossible,  the  strict  internal
disciplinary structures of punishment employed by the railway industry demonstrated
the determination of directors to pursue clerks as far as possible within the limits of their
powers. Indeed, their preference for a system of private justice which operated at the
pinnacle of the punitive spectrum and emphasised severity rather than leniency, together
with a frequently expressed desire for greater access to the public arena in such cases,
suggests that the predominantly private responses towards the embezzler were largely
conditioned by necessity rather than choice, and that with the opportunity employers
may have pursued a far more public system of punishment.
 
The scale of embezzlement and costs of public
prosecution
20 While  the  issue  of  proof  has  been  under-utilised  as  a  key  factor  in  determining
prosecutorial trends, alternative knowledge claims, such as the scale of offending and
costs attached to public indictment,  have often assumed a predominant place in this
discussion. As noted by numerous scholars, the financial seriousness of the embezzlement
has been seen to play a role in the decision of whether to pursue a prosecution46. At some
level it is undeniable that the financial size of an embezzlement had considerable bearing
upon the willingness of railway companies to prosecute employees. This was particularly
noticeable in cases involving very large amounts of money, as the most notorious cases of
the age demonstrate. For instance, the huge peculations of men like Leopold Redpath
(estimated  to  be  £240,000)  inevitably  required  the  fullest  and  most  public  form  of
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punishment available to employers47.  However, with the exception of such anomalous
cases, the private records of the railway industry suggest that the factors underlying the
likelihood  of  prosecution  were  not  simply  determined  by  the  amounts  involved.  As
demonstrated by figure 148, the records of the GWR company illustrate the considerable
financial variety of embezzlements prosecuted, ranging from those of only a few shillings
to more substantial  figures involving some hundreds of  pounds.  In fact,  a significant
number  of  prosecutions  involved  relatively  small  amounts  of  pecuniary  loss,
demonstrating  the  willingness  of  such  companies  to  prosecute  even  very  financially
trivial cases of embezzlement.
 
Figure 1: Financial scale of embezzlements prosecuted by GWR, 1925-26 & 1928-30
21 The readiness  of  companies  to prosecute those embezzling very trifling or  relatively
small  amounts  suggests  that  the financial  scale  of  the act  was not  necessarily  a  key
determinant  in  informing  the  prosecutorial  decision.  Neither  was  restitution  an
underlying signifier in such cases. Since companies such as the GWR were able to recoup
losses through the provision of sizeable financial sureties required of all those who held
positions of trust49, considerations of pecuniary loss do not adequately explain patterns of
prosecution. Rather, evidence suggests that the amounts embezzled, costs incurred, or
the outlet of restitution through sureties, were frequently less important considerations
than the desire  to  pursue and to punish those who had breached trust  through the
perpetration of embezzlement. Thus, whether an employee embezzled a few pence or
several hundred pounds, in committing the act of embezzlement a confidential servant
had broken the bond of trust placed in them by an employer and was therefore perceived
to deserve the maximum censure available without mitigation on financial grounds.
22 In the offence of  breaching trust  all  were equally culpable regardless of  the amount
stolen, and, therefore, where a public prosecution was possible directors demonstrated a
commitment to proceed in all cases in spite of the amounts involved. The example of Mr
Reilly,  a GWR clerk prosecuted in 1890 for the embezzlement of 2s.6d,  is  illustrative.
Despite the small amount involved in the case, or the ability of the company to recoup its
financial loss through the clerk’s sureties, the man’s offence was dimly viewed both by his
employers  and  subsequently  by  the  courts.  Indeed,  in  addressing  the  offender,  the
magistrate described the man’s offence as «a most serious one» because «the accused was
a trusted servant and he had betrayed that trust», and in these circumstances he felt able
to do no less than inflict a sentence of three months’ hard labour on the clerk50. Similarly
disregarding of the amounts involved in acts of embezzlement in adjudging seriousness,
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directors were universally stringent in their approach to the institution of proceedings
against  all  such  acts.  As  correspondence  between  those  responsible  for  determining
company  responses  to  offending  staff  reveals,  the  costs  of  prosecution  were  never
discussed as an immediate or pressing issue, and appeared to be of little consequence to
employers.  Indeed,  companies  even  offered  considerable  financial  rewards  for
information  leading  to  successful  convictions.  For  example,  at  the  mid-century  the
directors of the GWR offered the sum of £10 to employees who gave «voluntary» and
«prompt» evidence of any variety of «fraud» committed upon the company by one of its
staff51. Moreover, once a prosecution was instigated companies readily arranged to pay
wages and expense claims to servants who gave evidence on their behalf to ensure that
they were not financially disadvantaged by their absence from work or participation in a
trial52.
 
Paternalistic impulses, sympathy and leniency
23 Similarly,  explanations  for  the  predominance of  private  justice  which emphasise  the
paternalistic impulses of employers appear to be of limited utility in their failure fully to
understand the attitudes of  the railway industry,  as well  as the Victorian public and
judiciary, to the embezzler. Images of employers as protectors of embezzling staff are in
stark  contrast  to  the  outlook  of  railway  companies,  and  to  many  criminal  justice
practitioners, contemporary writers, members of the public, and victims of the offence.
As Victorian and Edwardian media reporting of the embezzler demonstrates, attitudes
towards this offender were extremely ambiguous53.  Thus, while some offenders might
receive public and/or judicial sympathy, the opposite was also true. Embezzlers were
regularly viewed as those whose respectable façade ultimately failed to hide their true
nature  and  base  moral  instincts,  and  who  consequently  deserved  punishment.
Furthermore,  rather  than  guaranteeing  a  more  sympathetic  or  lenient  attitude,  the
«respectable» persona and trusted position of the typical embezzler placed upon this
individual extra moral obligations of honesty and integrity. In this respect their offending
behaviour was more problematic than that of the traditional criminal and more deserving
of censure. In these circumstances a violation of trust was at least as likely to invoke
feelings of  resentment,  disapproval,  and condemnation from employers as  sympathy,
understanding, and leniency. Men who embezzled company money were often construed
as «doubly deviant» since they had broken both the criminal  law and also the trust
relationship between employer and employee54.
24 In  support  of  the  more  denunciatory  perceptions  of  the  embezzler,  the  attitudes  of
railway companies towards such staff erred very definitely towards severity rather than
leniency, and incredulity rather than sympathy. In contrast to the findings of scholars
such  as  Hall,  throughout  the  nineteenth  and  early  twentieth  centuries,  the  litigious
outlook of companies such as the GWR was a clear reflection of the severe threat posed by
the embezzler and the seriousness with which their offences were viewed. Emphasising
the gravity of the act over other considerations, railway directors reacted severely to
embezzlers and other financially dishonest staff. As noted above, where proof existed to
impose the maximum sanction of public punishment upon an employee directors actively
sought such measures. Indeed, where evidence enabled a prosecution to be instituted
companies rarely showed any inclination to withdraw proceedings or find mitigating
circumstances, even when implored to do so by offenders, their families, or influential
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acquaintances.  For example,  when the Reverend Welsford of Tewksbury wrote to the
directors of the GWR asking them to withdraw their action against his son (formerly a
goods clerk at  Birmingham) who had been committed to trial  for  «defalcation»,  and
«praying the directors intercede with the court for mitigation of his punishment», the
response was simply that, «the directors regret that they cannot discover any grounds
upon which to  [withdraw the  prosecution or]  recommend his  son to  the  favourable
consideration of the court»55.
25 Even when prosecution  was  not  utilised  employer  paternalism was  severely  lacking.
Directors showed little concern for the prospects of dishonest clerks, and went to some
lengths to reduce the future employment opportunities of untrustworthy staff. Indeed,
companies  extended a duty of  care to other potential  employers  by refusing to give
employment  references  to  such  men56.  In  efforts  to  counteract  the  problem  of  the
transference of dismissed staff between railway employers and reduce vulnerability to
embezzlement, during the 1850s a number of companies joined together in forming inter-
company blacklists of dismissed and/or prosecuted employees to ensure that such men
would not obtain another position elsewhere within the industry57. Finally, in contrast to
previous scholarly claims about the continuing paternalistic  sentiments of  employers
towards  those  with long service  histories,  previous records  of  good service,  or  good
mitigatory stories, such sentiments were of little value in altering the minds of railway
employers  in  cases  of  trust  breach.  As  the  private correspondence  of  the  industry
demonstrates, directors were not moved from their universally severe course of action
regardless  of  the  individual  circumstances  of  cases,  employment  records,  or service
histories  of  staff  involved.  Officials  demonstrated little  visible  sympathy towards  the
many dismissed clerks whose aetiological explanations of financial penury, low pay, and
considerable financial strain seemed to offer some incentive to leniency. Instead strict
disciplinary  policies  were  stringently  employed  against  all  those  who  were  strongly
suspected or proven to be dishonest, and directors generally remained unaffected by the
individual circumstances, explanations, or mitigating motives surrounding the offences
of men who perpetrated acts of fraudulence against them. This is clearly demonstrable
through private company records.
26 Within the railway industry, large numbers of trusted servants were brought to book for
various  pecuniary  losses  and  financial  «irregularities»58.  For  those  who  could  not
convince officials that their situation had been the result of some honest mistake, but
where  insufficient  proof  of  dishonesty  made  an  official  course  of  action  impossible,
dismissal was the primary course of action taken59. Thus, for example, the stated policy of
the London and North Western Railway was, that «in cases of dishonesty servants should
be dismissed at  once»60.  A similar strategy was utilised by the GWR, whose directors
practised  a  strict  and  unbending  rule  of  dismissal  towards  all  those  men who were
«irregular»  in  their  accounts  without  satisfactory  explanation61.  In  pursuing  such
responses directors failed to demonstrate leniency, understanding or paternalism.
27 Despite being a secondary punishment option (to public prosecution) dismissal without
prosecution was not necessarily a more lenient form of treatment. In fact, for directors
who required a harsh response to those believed to have embezzled company funds,
dismissal  was an extremely useful  penalty,  incorporating many of  the same punitive
outcomes of  prosecution.  For example,  those who had been dismissed often found it
impossible to gain further employment in positions of trust, owing to doubts over their
character. In a working environment where trust, character and «respectability» were
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crucially  important,  one  black  mark  against  an  employee’s  reputation  could  have
disastrous  consequences  for  their  standing  in  the  community  and  for  future  work
prospects62. The stigmatising effects of a dismissal were readily observable amongst the
private correspondence of  railway clerks who frequently wrote to company directors
claiming mitigation of their offences, telling of the consequences of their dismissal, and
begging to be reinstated when further work was not forthcoming. Such correspondence
spoke  repeatedly  of  the  very  serious  consequences  attaching  to  dismissal  for
«irregularity».  For  instance,  after  being  dismissed for  embezzlement  Frederick  Dadd
wrote  to  his  previous  employers  in  December  1914  claiming  that  he  had  been «left
stranded upon the labour market»:
At my age and with only clerical experience behind me, work is very difficult to
secure, and  I  know  not  which  way  to  turn.  I  have  had  no  payment  from  the
company since August 8, and should have been altogether without means but for a
few days temporary employment I was able to obtain, and if friends had not come
to my assistance for the time being63.
28 The clerk’s pecuniary difficulties and inability to secure further clerical work are echoed
in many similar cases. Thus, in 1907 when Mr Brown, a GWR clerk of thirty years service,
was  discharged for  having committed «a  serious  defalcation» of  more than £120,  he
described the consequences of his dismissal in the following terms: «I have blighted my
whole career by one great wrong act, which fills me with shame, and will be my life long
sorrow»64.  Yet  despite  such  remorse  and  pleas  for  leniency,  the  paternalism  and
sympathy of employers towards dismissed clerks was not readily observable amongst
railway officials.  Clerks often wrote to directors begging either to be retained in the
company’s  service,  or  some months  later,  to  be  reinstated,  telling of  their  desire  to
redeem themselves. For example, one «irregular» clerk wrote:
I  tender  my  deepest  and  fullest  apology  for  this  dishonourable  act  –  the  first
committed as a servant of the company during the whole of my 30 years service … If
my  case  receives  the  kind  consideration  of  the  board,  and  I  am given  another
opportunity somewhere to serve the company’s interests, I promise never again to
give the slightest cause for complaint, but will seek by every means in my power, to
regain in some measure the confidence I have now so deplorably lost … I wait with
intense anxiety for some relief from this awful suspense and pray that one more
chance may be given me65.
29 Nevertheless, those clerks whose «irregularities» were thought to be acts of dishonesty
were never retained or reinstated in any position regardless of their previous record,
mitigatory pleas, or personal circumstances66.
30 Such policies bore heavily upon the lives of those released under these terms. Clerks who
were dismissed as «irregular» and on suspicion of embezzlement or fraudulence felt a
very public sense of shame within their communities, and a number of disgraced men
avoided the social consequences of discharge through suicide. Thus, when Mr Bond, a
cashier  at  Swansea,  was  discovered to  be  «a  defaulter  to  a  very  large  amount»,  his
immediate suicide was evidence of the disgrace and stigma attached to his situation67.
Another clerk, Mr Gwyn, implicated in Bond’s embezzlement and suspended pending a
thorough  inquiry  into  the  case,  wrote  to  the  directors  calling  for  his  speedy
reinstatement and claiming that  the situation «reflects  seriously on my conduct  and
character … lowers me in the eyes of my fellow servants and neighbours and is really
most trying»68.
«Quiet thieves, quiet punishment»: private responses to the «respectable» off...
Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History & Societies, Vol. 9, n°1 | 2005
13
31 Furthermore, dismissal caused considerable economic strain. Stranded upon the labour
market, clerks often spoke of the debt which they quickly accumulated, and the poverty
they and their families were forced into. Thus, GWR clerk, Charles White, claimed to have
lost his home because of debt «owing to the absence of employment», and stated that his
family were consequently «reduced to a state of penury». According to White, therefore,
through their action against him the GWR directors had not only punished him but his
family also, since his failure to gain further employment (and the directors’ role in this
failure) had taken «the bread from my mouth, and also from the mouths of my wife and
family who are dependent upon me»69. Further illustrative is the case of Mr Howell. In
1881 Howell, a rent collector in the Swindon District of the GWR, was discovered to have
received  £174.0s.4d  on  behalf  of  the  company  which  he  had  not  accounted  for.  He
subsequently wrote to the directors pleading to be retained in the company’s service for
the sake of his family, stating:
Do not let my [nine] poor helpless babes be turned into the streets to starve for
there is  no other fate for them unless the directors have mercy for them. I  am
almost driven to madness when I think of this but I still have a little hope that
mercy will be shewn [sic] to me70.
32 The clerk’s pleas were ignored. Following his petition Howell and his family were ordered
to leave the company house in which they lodged, and the clerk was dismissed from the
employment of the directors without any hope of reinstatement71.
33 Not only were the families of embezzling clerks forced into poverty by the absence of a
sufficient income into the household, the punishment inflicted upon dependents could be
even more far reaching. The stigma of an embezzlement not only attached to the clerk
but also in some degree to their family. In illustration of this, in 1907 a GWR clerk of
thirty-years  service,  suspended  for  «irregularity»  pending  an  inquiry  into  the
circumstances, wrote to his superior stating:
I plead with you on behalf of my home, my wife, who you have known for so many
years, and my family of seven, that you will entreat the board not to dismiss me
from their  service,  which would ruin me entirely for the future,  and blight the
rising prospects of the members of my family72.
34 Yet despite pleas for leniency and frequent remonstrations about the wider ramifications
of dismissal for families, relatives, and friends, in dealing with dishonest staff directors
were continually unsympathetic to the employee’s future or that of their dependants.
Indeed, in most cases directors took little notice, demonstrating no continuing obligation
or regard for the welfare of those who had betrayed their trust.
35 Railway officials were keenly aware of the punitiveness of private punishments such as
dismissal in dealing with the dishonest clerk, a fact demonstrated by their discretionary
use of alleviating factors in cases where considerable uncertainty of dishonesty existed.
For instance, in such cases the GWR board occasionally withdrew a dismissal on condition
that  a  clerk  tendered  their  resignation.  This  decision  remained  at  the  discretion  of
directors  and  was  only  used  where  significant  doubts  about  the  nature  of  an
«irregularity» and the guilt of an employee persisted. Either way, the clerk was removed
from employment, although the effect of the two actions was considerably different. In
the eyes of future employers a resignation implied a voluntary act and did not carry the
stigmatising marks of a dismissal. In consequence, it was viewed differently by railway
employers  (in  providing  testimonials)  and  also  by  future  employers.  Thus,  unlike
dismissal, a resignation created fewer barriers to further clerical employment.
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36 The distinction between these two modes of punishment can be seen in the «defalcation»
of John Brittain before the GWR directors in 1886. Brittain, district cashier at Worcester,
was found to have embezzled about £70 of company money which he covered up by
making false entries in his accounts. «One of the worst features of the case», according to
the directors, was that Brittain may have «induced» the lad clerk in the office, Frederick
Wynne, to become party to concealment of the embezzlement «by making entries which
he knew to be false in the daily return». While Brittain’s fraudulence was in no doubt, the
fact of Mr Wynne’s collusion in the peculation was less certain. Wynne had certainly
made false entries in the company’s records, however, the question of whether he had
done  so  without  knowledge  of  the  fraud  or  alternatively  in  collusion  with  Brittain
remained unclear. In a report to the directors of the GWR the investigating officer in the
case set out the dilemma in the following terms:
If  Mr Wynne knew why these incorrect  entries  were made he is  a  party to the
fraudulent use of the company’s funds; and if such false entries did not arouse a
suspicion of Mr Brittain’s integrity, his intelligence is, I think, too limited to make
his continuance in the company’s service desirable73.
37 Both men were examined by the board of directors and it was decided that while Brittain
was clearly to be immediately dismissed from the service for his fraudulence, Wynne,
whose dishonesty remained uncertain,  «was allowed to resign his  appointment»74.  In
another case Mr Hampton, a clerk at Slough was called before the directors of the GWR on
a charge of  short  changing a  passenger,  Lady Corbett.  While  «the fact  of  fraudulent
intention in  doing so  was  not  however  clearly  established against  him»,  his  general
conduct  in  the  matter  was  nevertheless  considered  unsatisfactory.  In  consequence,
Hampton was allowed to resign from his position75.  While uncertainty of fraudulence
encouraged the use of forced resignation, alternatively, in cases where greater suspicion
of dishonesty existed, resignations were disallowed and employees were dismissed. In
1895, for example, when Francis Hammet, a GWR superintendent was suspected of having
«appropriated to his own use» almost £90 of  company money,  the man tendered his
resignation.  However,  the  board  of  directors  decided that  his  suspected  guilt  in  the
matter meant his resignation could not be accepted but that «he must be dismissed from
the company’s service»76.
 
Conclusion
38 While confirming the predominantly private nature of  responses to the treatment of
dishonesty  by  trusted  employees,  this  article  has  questioned the  validity  of  existing
claims about the factors underlying this trend, and offered an alternative picture of the
skewed  public/private  dimensions  of  justice  against  the  «respectable»  embezzler.
Through a case study of the Victorian and Edwardian railway industry it has highlighted
key factors which played a central determining role in the nature of justice, yet which
have been overlooked by scholars.  It  has  been demonstrated that  previous academic
insights into the skewed nature of prosecutorial trends in the case of embezzlers (and like
offenders) are,  in the case of one key industry at least,  less significant than hitherto
assumed.  Indeed,  it  has been shown that the work of Hall  (echoed throughout other
research) has made a number of over-simplistic generalisations which are unsupportable
in the context of the huge corporate railway enterprises of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.  Thus, the assumption that favourable treatment, underpinned by
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ideological stereotypes of the social and spatial dynamics of criminality, can account for
the overwhelmingly private nature of justice, is flawed on two fronts: first, it wrongly
supposes  that  the  private  arena  of  justice  was  a  more  lenient  one  than  its  public
counterpart;  second,  it  incorrectly  presumes  that  embezzlement,  fraudulence  and
breaches  of  trust  by  stereotypically  «untypical»  offenders  was  viewed  relatively
sympathetically. This was neither true of attitudes within the Victorian and Edwardian
railway industry or contemporary society more broadly. Furthermore, as the records of
this industry demonstrate, the importance of alternative concerns (particularly issues of
financial cost and time) often attributed a central place in informing company justice,
were  also  of  far  less  importance  within  the  disciplinary  apparatus  of  the  railway
company.  Such  longstanding  assumptions  have  been  so  widely  accepted  because  of
mistaken beliefs concerning the underlying influences upon employers, and a failure to
view the subject in its broadest socio-historical terms.
39 This  article  has  conversely  demonstrated the central  importance of  the  public,  legal
arena and its  crucial  influence upon patterns  of  punishment.  In  contrast  to  existing
research it has been shown that in the case of the railway industry a major influencing
factor upon the overwhelmingly private nature of punishment was the issue of attaining
sufficient legal proof to proceed into the public arena of the courts. The complexities of
eighteenth,  nineteenth,  and  early  twentieth-century  theft  laws,  and  particularly  the
difficulties of proving embezzlement greatly limited the ability of employers to proceed
to the public arena or even to label suspicious acts of pecuniary loss beyond the vague
terminology  of  «irregularity».  The  repercussions  of  this  legal  uncertainty  were  felt
throughout the Victorian railway industry and greatly impacted upon the scale of public
prosecution against the offence. Thus, rather than being motivated by paternalistic or
lenient sentiments, the widespread and persistent usage of private punishment against
embezzlers can alternatively be interpreted as a consequence of necessity on the part of
employers  without  recourse to  the  criminal  law.  Certainly  this  explanation  better
elucidates the notable punitiveness of private punishments against those suspected of
fraudulent behaviour.
40 Whether the findings of this study are applicable beyond its own parameters remains a
question for further empirical research. However, a number of factors would appear to
suggest that the issue of legal proof has a far wider historical and spatial applicability in
determining  the  public/private  dynamics  of  white-collar  justice.  In  particular,  the
general application of embezzlement statutes to all varieties of Victorian and Edwardian
industry implies a much broader experience of the difficulties of obtaining satisfactory
evidence to proceed into the public arena. In addition, the similar legal difficulties noted
by some modern criminologists77 at least implies the persistence of such problems beyond
the historical framework of this study.
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NOTES
2. For example,  Jennifer  Davis  has  concluded  that  nineteenth-century  employers  never
considered the law as the primary mechanism of justice in dealing with criminal acts perpetrated
in  the  workplace.  As  such,  «prosecuted  law  breaking  represented  only  a  tiny  proportion  of
similar behaviour,  which for various reasons,  never reached the courts» Davis (1989,  p.  400).
Similarly, in his discussion of the birth and proliferation of modern «white-collar crime» during
the Victorian and Edwardian period, George Robb has emphasised the «hidden nature» of such
offending behaviour and the inadequacies of the official picture of fraud and embezzlement Robb
(1992, p.  8).  See also Taylor (1998, pp. 44-45);  Kindleberger (1981, p.  78).  Likewise, in specific
reference to the pursuance of embezzlement within the modern business environment, socio-
legal scholar Jerome Hall has argued, that «very few known embezzlers are prosecuted», since
employers  are  extremely  reluctant  to  do  so,  preferring  instead  to  deal  privately  with  such
matters.  Indeed,  for Hall,  a  key feature of embezzlement remains its  overwhelmingly hidden
nature Hall (1952, p. 305). From within the field of criminology see, Sutherland (1961); Croall
(1992); Croall (1999); Nelken (2002); Davis, Croall, Tyrer (1998, pp. 57-59, p. 71); Levi (1989, p. 107).
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3. Hall (1952, p. 305).
4. Partly (if not largely) this failure to fully engage with this subject area is a consequence of the
general historical neglect of business and white-collar crime. Despite a small amount of recent
exploration into the subjects of «respectable», «business» and «white-collar crime», research of
this area remains sparse. Criminologists, to their cost, have shown little interest in varieties of
workplace  and  «white-collar crime»  before  1940,  while  historians  have  barely  scratched  the
surface  of  this  key  area.  Indeed,  notwithstanding  its  centrality  to  the  emergence  and
proliferation of business crime during the Victorian era, embezzlement has received little more
than passing comment.
5. This article utilises the records of a number of the larger companies, most prominently the
Great Western Railway Company, and to a lesser extent the North Eastern and London & North
Western Railways, both for practical and ideological reasons. The records of such companies are
more extensive and survive in larger numbers than those of other smaller companies. Indeed, the
records  of  the  GWR  represent  the  most  significant  and  complete  source  of  railway  records
available.  Furthermore,  the often held association between company expansion (through the
joint-stock company) and the widespread development of «white-collar crime», suggests that the
larger railway companies were those most likely to keenly and widely feel the effects of this
problem.  See  Perkin  (1971);  Robb  (1992);  Locker  (2004).  For  general  Victorian  contemporary
debate on this issue see also Dickens (1860);  Heron (1861);  Laing (1866);  Letsom Elliot (1868);
Stutfield (1898); Van Oss (1898).
6. This is, of course, a complex area to negotiate; see, Croall (1991, p. 281); Davis (1989, p. 400).
7. Hall  (1952,  ch.7).  Hall’s  work  remains  the  most  detailed  theoretical  insight  into  the
predominance of private justice against the embezzler and such factors have continued to be
viewed as  key signifiers  in  explaining the reactions  of  private  industry  to  the «respectable»
offender. Thus, scholarly understandings of the complex underpinnings of prosecutorial trends
remain closely  aligned with Hall’s  work.  For  instance,  see  Anderson (1976,  pp.  34-41);  Green
(1993, p. 101); Henry (1978, ch.7).
8. See also, Robb (1992, p. 133).
9. Hall (1952, p. 311, p. 318).
10. Such powers were considerably bolstered throughout the nineteenth century through the
extension and consolidation of the legal offence. See, Godfrey, Locker (2001); Locker (2004, ch.3).
11. This was particularly the case after 1868 when embezzlement was incorporated within the
range of summarily triable crimes, encouraging greater levels of prosecution. See Locker (2004,
ch.3); Wiener (1994, p. 11; pp. 259-60).
12. The number of persons involved in the daily running of the United Kingdom railway network
increased considerably across the second half of the nineteenth century from 47,000 in 1847, to
127,000 in 1860, and 274,000 by 1873 Hudson (1970, p. 12); also Kingsford (1970, p. xii).
13. For  instance,  Ireland  (1997)  notes  that  embezzlement  entered  Carmarthenshire’s  felons
register most commonly in connection with the railway industry.
14. Great Western Railway, Director’s Minutes (GWR, DM) extract, 28 th March 1924, min. no.6;
GWR, DM circular no.2920, General Manager’s Office, Paddington Station, 30th June 1924, London
Public Records Office (hereafter PRO) Rail 258/261.
15. The staff records of the railway industry are peppered with examples of prosecution against
financially  «irregular»,  dishonest  and  embezzling  staff.  Typical  examples  include,  Mr  Pybus,
North  Eastern  Railway  (NER)  stationmaster,  prosecuted  for  embezzling  £30,  North  Eastern
Railway,  Traffic  Committee  Minutes,  (NER,  TCM),  16th September  1853,  min.  no.407,  PRO  Rail
527/61; Mr Robinson & Mr Lane, NER clerks, similarly prosecuted, NER, TCM 13th April 1854, min.
no.1007, PRO Rail 527/61 & NER, TCM, 15th September 1854, min. no.1441, PRO Rail 527/61; George
Siddle, goods clerk, convicted of the embezzlement of £59 NER, TCM, 30th December 1874, min.
no.10440, PRO Rail 527/67; Charles Heath, chief booking clerk, prosecuted for embezzling over £60,
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within  the  private  arena  and  which  made  specific  offence  types  impossible  to  disentangle.
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of offences of a financial nature, involving sums of missing money and involving trusted servants
that remained within the private arena. For examples, see GWR, DM, at PRO Rail 250. Alternatively
see the similar NER, TCM, at PRO Rail 527. For further anecdotal evidence see also, Chapman (1925,
p. 56).
17. Hall (1952, pp. 304-319).
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Tarplet,  GWR,  DM,  18th September  1856,  pp.  143-4,  PRO  Rail  250/10;  Mr  Card,  GWR,  DM,  15th
October 1857, p. 46, PRO Rail 250/12; Mr Hoffman, GWR, DM, 3rd July 1851, p. 80, PRO Rail 250/5; Mr
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ABSTRACTS
The Victorian period witnessed a widespread proliferation in new varieties of employee crime,
associated  chiefly  with  the  «respectable»  echelons  of  the  nineteenth-century  workforce.
Alongside the rapid growth of business the emergence of offences such as embezzlement reached
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unprecedented levels. Within the private arena of the company confidential staff perpetrated
considerable  amounts  of  such crime,  a  claim widely accepted by academic scholars.  Yet  this
criminal world remains largely obscured by its predominantly private character. In consequence,
historians and criminologists have generally neglected the key centre for «respectable», «white-
collar»  delinquency,  and  therefore  current  knowledge  about  the  spatial  dynamics  of  justice
remains  limited.  Moreover,  when  discussed  the  theoretical  interpretations  of  scholars
concerning the skewed picture of public/private responses to this offender type have hitherto
typically resonated around a set of longstanding aetiological axioms. In examining the records of
one of the most significant industries of the Victorian era, the railways, and the key offence of
embezzlement, this article explores the responses of industry to the «respectable» offender, and
offers  a  critique  of  earlier  theorising  about  the  motivations  underlying  a  system  governed
predominantly by private justice.
L’époque victorienne a vu proliférer des variétés nouvelles de criminalité en col blanc associée
aux échelons « respectables » de la main-d’œuvre du XIXe siècle. À mesure que se développaient
les affaires, des infractions telles que l’escroquerie atteignaient des niveaux sans précédent. À
l’abri  des  murs  des  entreprises,  des  personnels  de  confiance  commettaient  un  nombre
considérable de ces infractions, réalité tout à fait reconnue par les universitaires. Pourtant, ce
milieu criminel  reste largement opaque en raison de son caractère essentiellement privé,  de
sorte que les historiens et les criminologues ont généralement négligé les lieux cruciaux de la
délinquance « respectable » et « en col blanc » et, par voie de conséquence, la dynamique spatiale
de  la  justice  pénale.  En  outre,  les  discussions  théoriques  du  caractère  biaisé  des  réponses
publiques/privées  à  ce  type de  délinquance ont  généralement  été  appuyées  sur  des  axiomes
étiologiques  anciens.  À  travers  l’examen  de  l’escroquerie  à  partir  des  archives  de  l’une  des
principales  industries  victoriennes,  l’industrie  ferroviaire,  cet  article  analyse  la  manière  de
traiter le délinquant « respectable » et fournit la base à une critique des théories antérieures
relatives aux motivations d’un système principalement gouverné par une justice privée.
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